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Abstract  
Excessive credit growth is often considered to be an indicator of future problems in the 
financial sector. This paper examines the issue of how best to determine whether the observed 
level of private sector credit is excessive in the context of the “countercyclical capital buffer”, 
a macroprudential tool proposed in the new regulatory framework of Basel III by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. An empirical analysis of selected Central and Eastern 
European countries, including the Czech Republic, provides alternative estimates of excessive 
private credit and shows that the HP filter calculation proposed by the Basel Committee is not 
necessarily a suitable indicator of excessive credit growth for converging countries. 
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Abstrakt 
Nadměrný růst úvěrů je často považován za indikátor budoucích problémů ve finančním 
sektoru. Tento článek se věnuje otázce, jak nejlépe určit, zda pozorované zadlužení privátního 
sektoru je již nadměrné v souvislosti s makroobezřetnostním nástrojem navrhovaným 
Basilejským výborem pro bankovní dohled v novém regulačním rámci Basel III, tzv. 
proticyklickým kapitálovým polštářem. Empirická analýza na vybraných zemích střední a 
východní Evropy včetně ČR ukazuje alternativní odhady indikátoru nadměrného zadlužení 
privátního sektoru a naznačuje, že výpočet pomocí HP filtru navrhovaný Basilejským 
výborem nemusí být pro konvergující země vhodným indikátorem nadměrného růstu úvěrů. 
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Introduction 
 
The Basel III reforms to the banking sector regulatory framework agreed in 2010 contain an 
important macroprudential element intended to dampen the potential procyclicality of the 
previous capital regulation. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2010a) 
has introduced a “countercyclical capital buffer” aimed at protecting the banking sector from 
periods of excessive credit growth, which have often been associated with growth in systemic 
risk. In good times, banks will – in accordance with set rules – create a capital reserve which 
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can then be used to moderate contractions in the supply of credit by banks in times of 
recession. 
 
One region that recorded a boom in lending to the private sector in the lead-up to the global 
financial crisis was the Central and East European (CEE) countries.
2
 The observed credit 
expansion was driven by many factors relating to both the demand and supply side of the 
credit market. Although the credit growth in these transition economies started from very low 
levels, the rate of growth in many countries has raised concerns about how sustainable such 
growth is in the medium term and whether it poses significant risks to the stability of the 
financial sector. 
 
This paper aims to draw on the historical experience of the CEE countries with credit 
expansion and, using the method proposed by the Basel Committee, to calculate and discuss 
what the countercyclical capital buffer level these countries might have had if the newly 
proposed regulation on the creation of capital buffers had existed before the crisis. The 
motivation for this analysis is to determine how suitable the Basel Committee’s proposed 
method for calculating excessive credit using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is for the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In these countries, rapid credit expansion may 
simply mean convergence to values typical of the advanced nations, and not excessive 
borrowing. For this type of country, we propose to use a method involving estimation of the 
fundamental-based equilibrium private credit level. Given that different countries have 
different characteristics, the Basel Committee allows national regulators to exercise discretion 
and specify different methods for setting the countercyclical capital buffer. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the risks associated with excessive 
credit expansion, looks at the situation in selected EU countries before the global financial 
crisis broke out, and briefly examines the logic of the countercyclical capital buffer as 
proposed by the Basel Committee. Section 3 takes a closer look at the disadvantages of 
applying the HP filter method and proposes an alternative technique for calculating excessive 
credit – the out-of-sample method. Both these calculation methods are then used on data for 
ten CEE countries. Section 4 illustrates the different implications of the alternative indicators 
of excessive credit growth for the countercyclical capital buffer settings of the banking sectors 
of the countries analysed. The conclusion attempts to generalise the results of the analysis and 
formulate recommendations for the national authorities responsible for macroprudential 
policy.  
 
1 Excessive Credit Growth 
 
Credit growth in CEE countries has caught the attention of many studies over the past decade. 
These studies have tried to identify not only the determinants of credit growth, but also its 
equilibrium level (Enoch and Ötker-Robe, 2007; Égert et al., 2006). The credit boom in some 
transition economies was strong enough to raise concerns about whether this trend was simply 
a manifestation of convergence to the average credit levels in advanced nations, or whether it 
was a case of excessive growth posing a risk to macroeconomic and financial stability 
(Hilbers et al., 2005). The central banks and supervisory authorities of some countries even 
assessed the situation as critical and in 2004–2007 introduced a series of tools for limiting 
credit growth (Dragulin, 2008; Herzberg, 2008). These tools ranged from “soft” measures, 
such as increased risk weights on selected loans and the introduction of guidelines and limits 
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(e.g. Estonia), through to very “hard” administrative restrictions on credit portfolio growth 
(Bulgaria). The extent of the measures, as measured by the number of different tools used to 
limit credit growth, was correlated to a large degree with the credit growth rate (see Figure 1). 
However, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the tools used, since most of them were 
applied just before the global financial crisis erupted. The decline in credit growth observed 
since then may thus have been due more to the sharp economic contraction and reduced 
demand for loans. The studies conducted up to now tend to conclude that the aforementioned 
tools are pretty ineffective and that credit booms can be limited in only a very limited way 
during good times (Kraft, 2005; Herzberg, 2008).  
Figure 1: 
Credit growth and number of tools applied to 
limit credit booms (number of measures on 
x-axis; average year-on-year real credit 
growth in 2005–2007 on y-axis) 
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Private credit ratios in selected EU countries 
(as % of GDP; 2007 Q4) 
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Despite the comparatively strong credit boom observed in 2003–2007, the stock of loans in 
many CEE countries in the pre-crisis year 2007 was still relatively low, especially in 
comparison with other EU countries (see Figure 2). Nevertheless, in terms of the private-
credit-to-GDP ratio, some countries of the region had reached levels typical of some euro area 
countries. The question therefore arises whether they were already showing excessive credit 
levels. One limitation of this comparison is that is based solely on data on domestic bank 
loans. This indicator understates total private credit, as it neglects loans provided by non-bank 
financial intermediaries and loans provided directly from abroad.  
 
Excessive credit growth can threaten macroeconomic stability in many ways. Given that 
lending supports consumption, growth in private sector loans can over-stimulate aggregate 
demand beyond the framework of potential output and cause the economy to overheat, with 
knock-on effects on inflation, the current account deficit, interest rates and the real exchange 
rate. 
 
At the same time, lending institutions can, in an economic growth phase, have over-optimistic 
expectations about borrowers’ future ability to repay their debts and therefore very often lend 
to high-risk borrowers. The upshot is that the bulk of “potentially” bad loans arise during 
upward phases of the credit cycle. In some CEE countries, private loans were provided in 
foreign currency because foreign interest rates were lower (see Figure 3). This further 
increases the risks for the banking sector, because if the domestic currency depreciates, the 
 4 
volume of credit expressed in the domestic currency rises, debt servicing costs go up, and 
foreign exchange risk turns into credit risk. In many cases, therefore, the aforementioned 
measures to contain credit growth were targeted primarily at reducing growth in foreign 
currency loans (Steiner, 2011). Furthermore, if a domestic credit boom is financed from 
foreign sources, as was the case in several CEE countries (except for the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Poland), the risk of the domestic banking sector having insufficient balance-
sheet liquidity (roll-over risk) increases. In economic bad times, domestic banks face a high 
risk of outflows of short-term foreign funds that cannot be financed by the sale of liquid assets 
(Hilbers et al., 2005).
3
  
 
Figure 3: 
Shares of foreign currency bank loans (as of 
end-2009; as % of total loans to given sector) 
 
Source: ECB
Note: Slovak Republic and Slovenia were already members of the 
euro area in 2009, so their foreign currency loans comprise 
currencies other than EUR.
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Figure 4: 
Countercyclical capital buffer (% of RWA 
as function of credit-to-GDP gap in p.p.) 
 
 
Sou ce: ECB Source: CNB 
Note: Slovak Republic and Slovenia were  
already members of the euro area in 2009,  
so their foreign currency loans comprise  
currencies other than EUR. 
 
A bursting of the credit bubble and negative macroeconomic developments, leading to 
external financing constraints and growth in non-performing loans (NPL), can therefore cause 
the banking sector serious difficulties. IMF (2004) estimates that more than 75% of credit 
booms were followed by banking or currency crises. This fear is consistent with existing 
studies in the field of early warning signals, according to which excessive credit growth can 
be considered one of the most reliable indicators of future problems in the banking sector 
(Borio and Lowe, 2002; Borio and Drehmann, 2009; Jimenez and Saurina, 2006; Saurina et 
al., 2008). 
 
As part of the preparation of the new Basel III regulatory framework for banks, the Basel 
Committee (BCBS, 2010a, 2010b) has proposed several tools for reducing the procyclical 
behaviour of the banking sector.
4
 One of the key tools is a proposal for banks to create 
countercyclical capital buffers during credit booms.
5
 Such buffers, expressed as a percentage 
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of risk-weighted assets (RWA) and covered by high quality capital (Tier 1, or even core 
Tier 1), would be set by the regulator within the range of 0% to 2.5%. As a guide for the 
setting of the buffer, the Basel Committee is proposing to use and regularly publish the 
difference between the current private credit ratio as a percentage of GDP and its trend value 
estimated using the HP filter (the “credit-to-GDP gap”). However, regulators may also use 
other methods to calculate the trend and other variables, such as the prices of various relevant 
assets and credit conditions. In bad times, this capital buffer would be “released” in order to 
slow any fall in the credit supply and thereby reduce the procyclicality of the financial system. 
The Basel Committee document itself (BCBS, 2010b) proposes to use the aforementioned 
guide as follows. The capital buffer would start to be created when the credit-to-GDP gap 
exceeded two percentage points. If the gap reached 10 percentage points or more, the buffer 
would reach the aforementioned maximum of 2.5% of RWA. For gaps of between 2 and 10 
percentage points, the buffer would vary linearly between 0% and 2.5%. For example, for a 
gap of six percentage points the buffer would be 1.25% of risk RWA (see Figure 4). For 
cross-border exposures, the buffer set by the regulator in the foreign jurisdiction would apply. 
For cross-border banking groups, the capital buffer would be applied on both a solo and a 
consolidated basis. 
 
It became clear during the discussion phase within the Basel Committee that a simple filtering 
technique would in many cases not necessarily lead to reliable estimates of excessive credit, 
so the final version of Basel III (BCBS, 2010b) gives regulators considerable discretion to set 
the buffer. The primary aim of the buffer, however, is not to restrict credit growth, but to 
create a capital reserve to give the banking sector greater protection from sudden changes in 
the credit cycle. At the same time, the Basel Committee documents emphasise the 
complementarity of this buffer with other macroprudential tools (BCBS, 2010b, p. 5), such as 
various limits on key indicators of borrowers’ ability to repay loans (the loan-to-collateral and 
loan-to-income ratios). 
 
2 Methods for Estimating the Equilibrium Credit Level 
 
A major problem in constructing an excessive credit growth indicator is determining what 
level of credit is excessive and might pose a threat to the financial sector. One traditional 
method is to apply the statistical Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, which obtains the trend from a 
time series. By comparing the actual credit-to-GDP ratio with its long-term trend obtained 
using the HP filter we can then estimate whether or not the credit level is excessive. This 
method is used quite routinely in the literature (Borio and Lowe, 2002; Borio and Drehmann, 
2009). Hilbers et al. (2005), for example, consider a credit-to-GDP gap of greater than five 
percentage points to be an indicator of excessive credit in the economy.  
 
Although the HP filter method is used quite often to determine trends in macroeconomic 
variables, it does have its drawbacks. A time series trend is dependent to a significant extent 
on the length of the chosen time series and the calculation is very sensitive to the smoothing 
parameter (lambda). A big problem as regards practical application in macroprudential policy 
is “end-point bias”, which generates a highly unreliable estimate of the trend at the end of the 
data period.
6
 Macroprudential policy, which, by contrast, requires assessment of the trend on 
the basis of current (i.e. end-of-period) data, would therefore be reliant on indicators subject 
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 One way of dealing with end-point bias is to extend the time series into the future by means of prediction. 
This, however, can introduce further uncertainty into the estimate linked with the quality of the prediction. 
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to a high degree of uncertainty. In the case of some CEE countries with relatively short time 
series, credit growth is incorporated directly into the trend itself by the HP filter, i.e. credit 
growth excess is counted as a trend (Cottarelli et al., 2005). Another relevant question is 
whether the credit ratio should take into account other denominators besides GDP, such as 
financial assets or total assets of the private sector. Although GDP is correlated to a 
significant extent with private sector income and therefore serves as an indicator of the ability 
to repay a given amount of loans, holdings of financial assets (deposits and securities 
investments) and non-financial assets (e.g. real estate) are also relevant to the evaluation of 
excessive credit. 
 
Figure 5 presents credit gaps with alternative denominators (GDP and financial assets and 
total assets of the private sector) calculated using the HP filter on data for bank loans in the 
Czech Republic with a high lambda parameter equal to 400,000. Such a high value of lambda 
was proposed in Basel III with an argument that credit cycle is usually longer than the 
business cycle. The filter is applied to quarterly data for the period 1998–2010, which, 
however, is regarded as relatively short from the international perspective (Basel III 
recommends at least a 20-year period). The estimates indicate that the current level of bank 
loans is above the long-term trend. However, the trend estimate is subject to a range of 
problems related to the short time series and above all to extraordinary factors linked with a 
fall in credit volume in 1998–2002 caused by a banking crisis in the 1990s and the clean-up of 
bank balance sheets ahead of the privatisation of large banks.  
 
As regards simulating possible macroprudential policy in the past, it makes more sense to 
apply the HP filter recursively, i.e. in each past period using only the data that were available 
in that period (at the end of 2005, for example, the trend value and therefore also the gap 
between the observed credit level and the trend is calculated on 1998–2005 data). This 
simulates the situation that the macroprudential policy-maker would hypothetically have 
found itself in had it been required to decide whether excessive credit growth was emerging. 
The calculated credit gaps expressed as a percentage of GDP indicate that the Czech Republic 
would have found itself in a situation of excessive credit as early as 2004 (see Figure 5). 
However, the aforementioned drawbacks of the HP filter play an even greater role in the 
calculated gap, as the problem period of 1998–2002 influences the trend.  
Figure 5: 
Credit gaps in the Czech Republic with 
alternative denominators (in %) 
 
Source: CNB, authors' calculations
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
03/98 03/00 03/02 03/04 03/06 03/08
Credit-to-GDP gap (actual period estimation)
Credit-to-assets gap
Credit-to-financial-assets gap
Credit-to-GDP gap
 
Figure 6: 
Credit-to-GDP ratios for a similar level of 
economic development (in %; GDP per 
capita in 2005 USD = USD 17,000 approx.) 
Source: IMF IFS, authors' calculations
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The main criticism of the HP filter technique, however, is that this method does not take into 
account economic fundamentals that affect the equilibrium stock of loans. An alternative 
method is to estimate the equilibrium private credit level in relation to key economic variables 
(such as the level of development of the economy measured in terms of real GDP per capita). 
In nutshell, this method says that if GDP per capita – as a proxy for the standard of living of 
an economy – is the main and only economic fundamental, all countries with the same level 
of development should have a similar equilibrium credit level. Poorer countries should have a 
lower equilibrium credit level than wealthier countries. A comparison of bank loans as a 
percentage of GDP for the Czech Republic in 2009 and selected euro area countries in years 
when they were at a similar level of economic development indicates, in contrast to the HP 
filter findings, that the credit ratio in the Czech Republic is below the level consistent with its 
economic level (see Figure 6).
7
 
 
Given that the CEE countries started from very low private credit levels, however, the 
estimation of a suitable econometric model on data for these countries would capture the rapid 
growth caused by convergence towards the average level of the advanced nations. As Égert et 
al. (2006, p. 14) point out, such estimated elasticities of the relationships between 
fundamentals and credit would be overstated. At the same time, the estimates would reflect 
not the equilibrium level, but only the present relationship between economic fundamentals 
and private credit.  
 
For this reason, the existing literature suggests using out-of-sample (OOS) panel estimation, 
i.e. estimating the model on a different sample of countries (so called in-the-sample countries) 
and applying obtained elasticities to the data for the countries for which the equilibrium credit 
level is being estimated (so called out-of-sample countries). This approach assumes a priori 
that the stock of credit of “in-the-sample” countries, which serve for estimating elasticities, is 
at equilibrium on average, which is quite a significant assumption. Therefore, one needs to 
choose suitable group of “in-sample” countries that best meets the need to estimate the correct 
equilibrium relationships between economic fundamentals and private credit. The existing 
studies on this topic therefore normally use the developed countries of the EU or OECD as 
appropriate countries for comparison (Kiss et al., 2006; Égert et al., 2006). For this study, the 
advanced EU countries were used as “in-sample” countries. Owing to the current debate 
regarding the excessive debt of the PIIGS
8
 countries, these countries were omitted from the 
calculation of the equilibrium credit level.
9
 
 
A variety of econometric methods can be used for OOS estimation. Given the properties of 
the variables used, however, traditional panel methods run into the problem of nonstationary 
time series, mutual regression of which can lead to spurious results. The traditional solution to 
the problem of nonstationarity of variables involves differentiating them. This step allows us 
to obtain the short-run relationship between the variables by regression, but the longer-run 
relationship is lost in the differentiation. The long-run relationship between nonstationary 
variables can be better estimated if the variables are cointegrated. This fact is used by the 
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ECM (error correction model) method, which estimates not only the long-run relationship 
between the cointegrated variables, but also the potential short-run deviations from this long-
run relationship. 
We use the PMG (pooled mean group) estimation method, introduced for panel estimates by 
Pesaran et al. (1999). It, too, is based on this principle of short-run deviations from the long-
run trend. This method can be used to estimate the long-run relationship between the credit-
to-GDP ratio and other variables, which is identical for all countries, whereas the short-run 
deviations from this relationship can differ across countries. The PMG model therefore allows 
heterogeneity of the estimates for individual countries in the short run. However, the long-run 
relationship of the cointegrated variables is common to all the countries in the sample (more 
technical details regarding estimation method is available in the Appendix). 
 
The data used for the OOS method were obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s IFS 
(International Financial Statistics) database, which provides the required macroeconomic data 
with a sufficient history (which is vital for estimating long-run relationships). For this reason, 
we used data for a 30-year period (1980–2010). The available statistics on bank loans to the 
private sector were used as the credit indicator. These statistics slightly underestimate the total 
credit of the private sector, as they do not include non-bank financial intermediaries (e.g. 
leasing) and cross-border loans. Data on aggregate household consumption, government debt, 
short-term interest rates, unemployment, inflation measured by the GDP deflator, and GDP 
per capita in dollar terms were also used. 
 
A long-run cointegration relationship between the credit-to-GDP ratio, the household 
consumption-to-GDP ratio and GDP per capita in USD was identified for the set of in-sample 
countries. The GDP per capita variable in the long-run relationship captures the different 
degree of wealth of the economy, which therefore also influences the equilibrium private 
credit level (Terrones and Mendoza, 2004). 
 
The following equation gives estimates of the coefficients of the long-run relationship 
between the cointegrated variables and the values of the coefficients in the short run, which 
are given as the mean of all the estimates for the relevant countries.
10
 
 
∆ (credit/gdp)t = credit/gdpt-1 + 0.7cons/gdpt +0.013 gdp/popt }long-run relationship 
   
 ∆(cons/gdp)t-1 0.07inft-1 + 0.014  }short-run deviations  
   
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance of the estimated coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively 
Credit/gdp represents the ratio of private sector credit to GDP, cons/gdp denotes the ratio of 
household consumption to GDP, gdp/pop is GDP per capita in thousands of dollars and inf is 
the change in the price level, expressed as the year-on-year change in the GDP deflator. 
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Further, in the estimated equation only those variables were kept that were significant at least at a 10 % 
confidence level. Also, more empirical approach was used as in Sekine (2001), therefore in short-run part of 
the equation inflation is present, which is not in the long-run part. 
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Besides the aforementioned variables, other factors that might affect the explained credit/gdp 
ratio were included in the model. For example, the government debt-to-GDP ratio might 
capture any crowding out of bank lending to the private sector.
11
 Also, the real interest rate, or 
changes therein, should, as the cost of financing, be in a negative relationship with the 
explained variable. However, as the final specification of the model indicates, these variables 
were not significant even at the 15% level.
12
 On the basis of the model, short-run deviations 
from the long-run trend are given as a function of the change in the consumption-to-GDP 
ratio and as a function of inflation. Based on the estimated coefficients, we can conclude that 
in the long-run relationship the credit-to-GDP ratio increases with increasing wealth of the 
economy and with an increasing consumption-to-GDP ratio. This factor then positively 
affects the explained variable in the short-run relationship as well, while inflation acts in the 
opposite direction. These conclusions are in accordance with intuition as regards the effects of 
the variables used on the credit-to-GDP ratio. 
 
The estimated parameters of the model were applied to data for the CEE countries to obtain 
values of the “equilibrium” credit ratio. The OOS calculations may in some cases imply 
significantly different conclusions regarding excessive credit compared to the calculations 
using the HP filter (see Figure 7). According to the HP filter, the credit-to-GDP gap indicates 
excessive credit in the recent period not only for the Czech Republic, but also, for example, 
for Slovakia, Lithuania, Romania and Poland, whereas the econometric estimate does not 
confirm this excessive credit level (values in the positive part of the chart indicates excessive 
private credit-to-GDP ratios). By contrast, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia now have 
excessive credit-to-GDP ratios according to the OOS method. It is clear, therefore, that the 
two calculation methods used give contradictory results in some cases. 
Figure 7: Comparison of credit-to-GDP ratios for various calculation methods (in p.p.)  
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3 Simulation of the Size of the Capital Buffer  
 
One of the questions associated with the new Basel III rules is whether the requirement to 
create a countercyclical capital buffer would contribute to the creation of capital reserves in 
those CEE countries which experienced significant problems in their banking sectors during 
the global financial crisis. In the following simulation, the size of the capital buffer is 
calculated for individual CEE countries using the two aforementioned methods, i.e. the HP 
filter method and the econometric OOS method. As the crisis did not manifest itself fully in 
the CEE countries until late 2008 and (in particular) 2009, i.e. after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008, we set mid-2008 as the starting point for the buffer calculation.  
 
Table 1: Simulation of countercyclical buffer calculation 
(data as of 2008 Q2) 
HP filter Out-of-sample HP filter Out-of-sample
Bulgaria 11.4 10.8 2.5 2.5
Czech Rep. 9.5 -15.0 2.4 0.0
Estonia 5.3 27.9 1.0 2.5
Lithuania 6.9 -8.3 1.5 0.0
Latvia 1.0 19.6 0.0 2.5
Hungary -1.4 -10.7 0.0 0.0
Poland 3.0 -23.3 0.3 0.0
Romania 6.1 -27.3 1.3 0.0
Slovakia 6.1 -22.8 1.3 0.0
Slovenia 5.4 5.5 1.1 1.1
Source: authors' calculations
Credit-to-GDP gap (%)
Countercyclical capital buffer 
(% of RWA)
 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
The results of this simple simulation indicate that only four countries needed a countercyclical 
capital buffer according to the OOS method (Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia needed the 
maximum possible 2.5% of RWA, while Slovenia needed 1.1% of RWA).  
Figure 8: 
Credit-to-GDP gap via out-of-sample and 
Tier 1 ratio in 2008 
(gap in p.p.; Tier 1 capital ratio in 2008) 
 
Chart 8
Credit-to-GDP gap via out-of-sample and Tier 1 ratio in 2008
(gap in p.p.; Tier 1 capital ratio in 2008)
Source: IMF, authors' calculations
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Figure 9: 
Credit-to-GDP gap via out-of-sample and 
change in RoE 
(gap in p.p.; change in RoE of banking sector 
in p.p.) 
Chart 10
Credit-to-GDP gap via out-of-sample and change in RoE
(gap in p.p.; change in RoE of banking sector in p.p.)
Source: IMF, authors' calculations
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It is relevant to ask whether the banking sectors of these countries had a sufficient capital 
reserve already in 2008, building a “would-be” capital buffer in anticipation of possible 
problems in the banking sector due to the experienced credit boom. Figure 8 indicates that 
with the exception of Bulgaria, which has set its minimum regulatory limit on capital 
adequacy higher than the traditional 8%, the countries identified by the OOS method as 
having excessive credit ratios (i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia) had relatively low Tier 1 
capital ratios. 
 
Several indicators can be used to compare the impacts of the crisis on the banking sectors of 
individual countries. In this paper, we look at the change in banking sector profits between 
2008 and 2009 (in p.p. of return on equity, RoE), as profitability reflects both credit and 
market losses as well as impact on pre-provision income from possible higher funding costs. 
A simple graphical analysis reveals that the countries identified by the OOS method as having 
excessive credit ratios recorded large losses in their banking sectors in 2009, causing the RoE 
to decline dramatically (see Figure 9) and even in some cases leading to negative RoE in 2009 
(Latvia). Two of the identified countries, namely Latvia and Slovenia, have seen governments 
stepping in and providing public support in 2009. It is worth mentioning that the HP method 
would not have identified the problems building up in the Latvian and Estonian economies, 
which were hit hard by the crisis and, especially in the case of Latvia, suffered very high real 
costs. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper discusses methods for calculating excessive private sector credit in the Central and 
Eastern European region and their suitability as regards the creation of the countercyclical 
capital buffer introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2010a). 
The BCBS has recommended the use of an excessive credit indicator based on the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter technique as a guide for setting this buffer. 
 
The paper shows that the HP filter-based calculation of the excessive credit indicator is not 
necessarily appropriate in certain cases. For the CEE countries in particular, rapid credit 
expansion may simply mean convergence to values typical of the advanced nations, and not 
excessive borrowing. As an alternative, the paper suggests considering excessive credit 
calculation methods that better reflect the evolution of a country’s economic fundamentals. 
One such method is an out-of-sample technique based on estimates for advanced EU 
countries which are subsequently used to calculate the equilibrium credit levels of the CEE 
countries. 
 
Although statistical filtering techniques such as the HP filter do have a role to play in the 
analysis as a first step in the interpretation of the available data, a broader set of indicators and 
methods should be employed to determine a country’s position in the credit cycle. Our chosen 
method, based on economic fundamentals, would have better identified the problem of 
excessive credit in those CE countries whose banking sectors recorded serious problems 
during the crisis. Although this calculation technique has its limitations, it can be considered 
as a complementary indicator of excessive credit, especially for small converging economies. 
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Appendix 
 
A) Detailed description of the data time series used: 
IMF IFS: AF.ZF... National Currency per US Dollar average period 
IMF IFS: 22D..Z CLAIMS ON PRIVATE SECTOR 
IMF IFS: 32D..ZF... CLAIMS ON PRIVATE SECTOR 
IMF IFS: 32AN.ZW... CLAIMS ON GENERAL GOVT. (NET) 
IMF IFS: 222A..ZF... CLAIMS ON GENERAL GOVERNMENT 
IMF IFS: 60P..ZF... Interest rate 
IMF IFS: 64...ZF... Index CPI 
IMF IFS: 67R..ZF... Unemployment rate 
IMF IFS: 99Z..ZF... Population 
IMF IFS: 96F..ZW... HOUSEH.CONS.EXPND.,INCL.NPISHS EUROS 
IMF IFS: 99BIPZF... Deflator HDP (base year = 2005) 
IMF IFS: 99B..ZF... Gross Domestic Product in the National Currency 
 
Time series of interest rates for some countries were completed using the ECB and Eurostat 
databases and data provided by national central banks. 
 
 
B) Technical details regarding used PMG and MG estimates 
The pool mean group (PMG) and the mean group (MG) estimators are error correction forms 
of the autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) model, where the dependent variable in its first 
differences is explained by the lagged independent and dependent variables in both levels and 
first differences. The equation is expressed as follows: 
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where y is dependent variable, x represents set of v independent variables, max1 and max2 
represent maximum lags used, and α, β, γ  are estimated coefficients. Coefficient α represents 
the long-term relationship, which is specific for each cross-section in the MG estimator or the 
same for every country in the case of PMG estimator.  Parameter ρ is the country specific 
error correction term, i.e. the speed of adjustment towards the equilibrium. 
 
For more details see Pesaran et al. (1999). 
i = 1,..., N, 
t = 1,..., T, 
